The Power of ROFR (Rights of First Refusal) 💥💥💥

[Hydrogen]

Er sorry- what?

I’m saying add a conveyor or a haul shaft to SLOS design and pull an extra 3-4-5mt capacity depending on diameter - above and beyond the 3Mt out of decline - It’s quite simple. It’s exactly what they just did at Tanami.

That itself makes the SLOS - a bulk operation Zoros - I’m not sure what Bamps is getting hot under the collar about he’s seems stuck on the decline. .

It may cost a bit extra, but as the mine will be being used for generations the vertical footprint means this infrastructure can remain in use for generations.

For example it’s now possible to build a deep 1800-2500m mine shaft two or three separate sections - one above other simultaneously and then connect them later - this happened at Tanami - or I presume concurrently in two separate project stages several years apart. The upper section could be used years before the lower deeper section was required, completed and connected.

Bamps has a different view but is totally wrong on this point IMO. ( Hence the detailed Sprott note, which he just dismissed for some reason?) . I know this because Shaun has explained it speculatively. Figuratively, if you like what it might look like. A bit like the nickel which he also explained briefly to everyone (when pressed - but has since gone quiet)

How it’s paid for we don’t know as we still don’t know the full costs of construction once the project is 100% in GGPs hands - but It will be a mix free cash flow, debt and equity.

IMO there’s a lot that Newcrest could have explored and said - but didn’t, for obvious reasons. I’m expecting Shaun to get aggressive with the news flow and to start to explore how Havieron will grow the moment he secures 100%… and I expect much of this will be a surprise to the market. I genuinely believe NCM held the project back as much as possible.

That’s my view and I think the general gamesmanship evidence from NCM support it. Like Shaun said, “if I’d produced that PFS at NST I’d have been taken around the back of the office and shot”.

[Hydrogen]

Hydrogen - you talk about ROFR. So what is the difference between this and what GGP have which is ROLR - in terms of what you describe?

Secondly, even if GGP bought Telfer for a dollar, the cost of purchasing the remaining 70% of Hav would be considerable. Add to this the cost of then progressing Hav to production and then extending the SLOS out for another 'X; years BEFORE Bulk underground mining commences - means 1 to 1.5 billion plus BEFORE you even look at raising a billion plus on the ASX, 12 months from now. How is this going to be paid for?

Thirdly - if GGP can 'double' the production outage to 6mt days after the purchase of Hav (via their own FS) ........why won't NEM do this beforehand anyway to ramp up the saleable value of Hav in the first instance to all interested parties and get a shed load more money for it?
Z

Zoros - I realise you are exceptionally skeptical of my comments... but here's a few thoughts to mull over

Telfer probably isnt worth $1. It might be worth negative $150m and maybe even negative $200m. My view is Nobody in their right mind would consider buying Telfer without securing major access to Havieron (which Wyloo via GGP has ROLR over)

70% could be purchased directly based on $150m rehab discount and the Grant Samual valuation $500-600m on 100% basis.
Add in the 'problematic' scenario created by Newcrest's reciprocal ROLR - that makes the project exceptionally risky for anyone other than GGP
(due to said ROLR) a point I note, not consider openly in the Grant Samuel valuation.

So what if Wyloo puts up $200m and GGP put up $200m from a bank syndicate and they go 50:50 on the outstanding 70%, for example?
Results is GGP 65% owner Wyloo 35%JV owners. Then each needs to add a further say circa $150m to fund the mine build. Or whatever ratios they land on

The floor is wide open for any variation on this concept.....

Re The final build cost Under those circumstances lets speculate that GGP needs another c$200m to complete the Hav build out and another $50m for a conveyor decline and modifications at Telfer... That can be raised on the ASX as the value proposition will be 100% clear.

Please note The Australian pension funds do not mess about - they will pile into a major new domestic copper producer on the ASX - FFS - One single Pension fund owns almost 15% of Sandfire resources - see list here - THE LAST remaining mid-cap copper producers on the ASX.

I mean jesus, Zoros I know you are jaded, but just look at that list of pension funds backing Sandfire 5 of the top 10 holders. (we have several ex Sandfire guys at GGP)

[Lennie]

Zoros.. and Hydro .. something missing from both your posts is .. IF GGP buy Telfer they will instantly be making money, plus I would expect GGP to have an idea how they could make even more out of Telfer .. that would pay the AISC and the mine development costs .. imho.

[zoros]

Lennie - there are two sides to a coin. The other side you forgot to mention is that the buyer of Telfer will have to sign a guarantee with the government to restore the site to an appropriate environmental standard. And how much do you think that would cost. Clue: In excess of $1Bn...So a future buyer must take this into account (which is why NEM could quite easily 'give the site away' to absolve itself of its restoration duties at some stage in the near future).

Hydro - you're getting worse....you have literal darrhoea which is circumlocutory to say the least!
Only recently you did a war and peace on shorting - which (as usual) was far from reality, now you're doing the same with future finance and mining options for GGP.
Even Bamps can't figure out your methodology.now.
Whoever buys Tel?Hav is going to need billions (plural). And that won't come cheap. In regard to mining - the SLOS will pay for the Bulk mine but over time - a long time. There are no short cuts in either domain (finance/mining).
Z

[ManFromUruguay]

Zoros based on your assessment what would you like to happen that will be in the best interests of GGP shareholders?
MFU

[Hydrogen]

Maybe let Bamps speak for himself Zoros? Since when was Bamps god father of ggp - didn’t he suggest 25 or 40moz or some other ludicrous number?
I know Shaun has a very different view on greater than 3Mt, if you care to ask him, in person.
Not sure what you are talking about - how I was wrong about the shorting? - they are still short. They are fully in control and trying to buy back today IMO something very odd about today’s trading. Further I can see them: At line 27 on Bloomberg. I can also see very minor changes to holdings on Bloomberg. Albeit Blackrock sold a few.

Maybe add something helpful Zoros? Anything? Apart from chipping at the people who actually know WTF is going on here, eh?

Top is March 2024
Bottom is December 2024

Virtually no changes, as you can see.

Ps the Telfer Rehab liability is $250m and was fully documented on page 57 the Grant Samuel report? Did you even read it Zoros? And PS What happened to Newcrests 'guarantee to the government' to restore and rehabilitate.

Newcrest/Newmont appear to be just selling that Rehab liability on.

Duh?

[Lennie]

Zoros.. I am sure SD is well aware of that and would expect a yearly accumulation of funds to cover there's costs from profits .. which again can be claimed against tax .. Telfer could be given away at a cost to Newmont towards the decommissioning ., which would reduce the cost of 70% of Hav .. it doesn't seem such a huge issue and I am sure the BOD have looked at every angle which you nor have a clue about ! We shall just have to wait and see .. also if Telfer is going to be such a burden SD has already said building our own processing plant at Hav is feasible !

[Hydrogen]

So Zoros do tell me how the rehabilitation costs for Telfer are $1bn - where on earth did you get that from? I hope not Bamps ?

Becuase the Newcrest Grant Samual report categorically states the following :

cash operating costs of approximately $53/t of milled ore over the project life, reflecting the step- change in cost profile:

• from FY24 to FY26, as the lower cost open-pit mining operation winds down; and
• from FY27 onwards, as operating costs step up due to the transition to underground-only
operations at both Telfer and Havieron;

 other costs including state royalties (approximately 2.5% of gold revenue and 5.0% of copper revenue), treatment and refinery charges, tolling recoveries (for Havieron), penalties and cash rehabilitation costs (assumed to be approximately $160 million for Telfer and $105 million for Havieron);

Now please stop bothering the board with garbage tilted against me. And learn to read my posts more carefully. Thanks.

[Hydrogen]

Zoros here is a useful reading for you about Telfer's underground mine. (Page 393 of the Grant Samuel's Booklet)

Telfer

Underground mining is primarily conducted via sub-level caving, which unlike block caving, allows the orebody to progressively “cave” over a series of parallel sublevels in a top-down sequence (as opposed to bottom-up). The ore above the sublevel is drilled, following which the drillholes are charged and fired to allow the broken ore to fall into the sublevel, where the ore is recovered and subsequently tipped down an ore pass system to the haulage level. The ore is then trucked to the underground crushing station and lifted by a hoisting shaft to the surface. Different mining methods such as open stope mining or paste fill stope mining are selectively used for higher grade areas of reef mineralisation. ROM ore from this mining front is trucked directly to a surface stockpile. The underground mine is designed to have an ore production capacity of up to 6Mtpa.

Telfer consistently produced approximately 400koz of gold per annum between FY20 and FY22 despite declining ore grades as reduced downtimes at the processing plant facilitated higher throughput of treated ore. The ramp-up in processing throughput stalled in FY23 as a result of two separate planned maintenance shutdown of the process trains and temporary shutdown due to Cyclone Ilsa.

The vast majority of material mined continues to be sourced from the West Dome open pit which entails a substantial amount of waste stripping that can vary depending on the phase of the mining sequence. The very high material mining rate in FY20 was impacted by the pre-stripping campaign that involved a high amount of waste (rather than ore) mined. These upfront “preparatory” works were required to expose more ore for treatment in subsequent years (albeit at declining head grades). Accordingly, cash costs (as measured in AISC) have trended upwards and reached historically high levels in FY21 (and again in FY23). Costs have also been impacted by declining grades, unfavourable exchange rate movements and production stripping at a series of cutbacks (e.g. Stage 5 in FY21 and Stage 8 in FY23).

Capital expenditure has remained broadly consistent at around $60 million per annum (well below levels incurred in the 2010s), reflecting the limited remaining life of the mine. The uptick in capital expenditure in FY23 reflects the investments in the West Dome Stage 8 cutback which was approved in November 2022 and became operational in the March 2023 quarter.

RE HAV TELFER Combined operation;

cash operating costs of approximately $53/t of milled ore over the project life, reflecting the step- change in cost profile
• from FY24 to FY26, as the lower cost open-pit mining operation winds down; and
• from FY27 onwards, as operating costs step up due to the transition to underground-only
operations at both Telfer and Havieron;

other costs including state royalties (approximately 2.5% of gold revenue and 5.0% of copper revenue), treatment and refinery charges, tolling recoveries (for Havieron), penalties and cash rehabilitation costs (assumed to be approximately $160 million for Telfer and $105 million for Havieron).

[Hydrogen]

Grant Samuel Valuations of $500m - $600m for Telfer Hav

SCENARIO 1

Scenario 1 assumes that Newcrest successfully develops the Havieron project and identifies new mining fronts to extend the operating life of Telfer. The production case includes the following assumptions:
 total ore production of 59Mt over the project life, including:
• 37Mt from Telfer’s existing open pit and mining fronts through to FY26. Head grades decline to
less than 0.5 g/t gold and 0.1% copper as the ore reserves in these areas are depleted;
• 8Mt from new higher grade underground mining fronts in Telfer at slightly lower production rates than the historical underground operations (at around 0.9Mtpa). Production from these areas are assumed to commence in FY28 and run through FY35; and
• 14Mt from Havieron from FY27 to FY35, which ramps up to 2Mtpa in the second year of operations. Head grades are substantially higher than at the legacy mining operations at Telfer (averaging around 3.7 g/t gold and 0.5% copper);
 total ore milled broadly equals ore production in each year (with the exception of the wind-down of ore stockpiles in the first years of operations). Following the conclusion of open pit mining operations, recovery rates are expected to jump from around 75% to 87-91%.

As a result, gold production over the project life is approximately 2.4Moz and can be broadly categorised into two distinct phases:

• between FY24 and FY26, a sharp decline from around 400koz of gold in FY24 (consistent with historical periods) to just 120koz in FY25 and 90koz in FY26 (and zero in FY27); and
• between FY28 and FY32, approximately 250-290koz gold per annum as higher grade ore from the new mining areas is processed before ramping down in the final three years of operations. Havieron accounts for around 75-80% of gold production in each year.

Approximately 490koz of gold sales are assumed to be hedged at fixed Australian dollar contracts through FY26 (representing approximately 77% of total sales over that period). The balance is sold at spot prices.

Total copper production over the project life is approximately 100kt and produced at 9kt per annum over the project life (higher production rate in the second phase due to improved copper head grades and recovery rates);

 cash operating costs of approximately $53/t of milled ore over the project life, reflecting the step- change in cost profile
• from FY24 to FY26, as the lower cost open-pit mining operation winds down; and
• from FY27 onwards, as operating costs step up due to the transition to underground-only
operations at both Telfer and Havieron;

 other costs including state royalties (approximately 2.5% of gold revenue and 5.0% of copper revenue), treatment and refinery charges, tolling recoveries (for Havieron), penalties and cash rehabilitation costs (assumed to be approximately $160 million for Telfer and $105 million for Havieron);

 total capital expenditure comprises:
• upfront development costs in relation to Havieron (primarily incurred between FY24 and FY27). The capital expenditure is based on the initial estimates contemplated in the 2021 pre-feasibility study and escalated for cost inflation, scope changes and new geotechnical information;

• other growth capital expenditure of approximately $35 million (most of which is incurred between FY28 and FY32) to develop new Telfer underground mining extensions; and

• sustaining capital expenditure of approximately $30 million per annum (total at both Telfer and Havieron); and
 income tax rate of 30% (the Australian corporate tax rate).

SCENARIO 2

Scenario 2 incorporates the development of:
 19Mt in incremental ore inventory from Havieron (33Mt total) as a result of successful resource-to- reserve conversion, including the inferred resource zone at the high grade Southeast Crescent Zone and Breccia Zone. Mining rates improve to 3Mtpa and extend the mine life to FY39; and
 14Mt in incremental ore inventory at Telfer underground (22Mt total). Mining rates ramp up to as high as 3.5Mtpa and extend the mine life to by an additional year to FY36.
Total ore milled increases to nearly 100Mt over the project life (representing over 55% of total mineral resource at Telfer’s operating deposits and Havieron). As higher grade areas are included in Scenario 2, total gold and copper production over the mine life increase by a greater proportion to 4.3Moz gold and 184kt copper over the life of mine.

Cash operating costs are slightly higher (approximately $55/t of milled ore over the project life) as more production is weighted towards the higher cost underground operations than in Scenario 1. Capital expenditure is expected to be approximately $320 million higher than in Scenario 1 due to the investments associated with developing new underground mining fronts (of which approximately 85% of the incremental spend is incurred in Havieron).
Rehabilitation costs are expected to be unchanged.
The following chart shows the ore volumes assumed to be produced from Telfer (inclusive of Havieron) (on a 100% basis) as well as the expected gold and copper in each year (incremental volumes from Scenario 2 are represented by dotted lines):

Grant Samuel’s valuation range of $500-600 million takes into account a number of subjective judgements, particularly the:
 future resource-to-reserve conversion from Telfer underground; and
 valuation upside from the development of Havieron.

The value of existing mining operations at Telfer is constrained by its remaining reserve life and is further capped by its declining free cash flow profile over that period as a result of naturally declining grades and cutback investments. While Telfer has consistently generated EBITDA in excess of $100 million per annum in recent years, free cash flows have been substantially lower.

Extensions will be required to sustain ongoing operations at Telfer beyond FY26 and defer its rehabilitation obligations. Studies to extend the open pit mining operations remain at very early stages and have not been included in the valuation. On the other hand, studies for additional underground mining fronts are more advanced but collectively would still mean a substantial reduction in scale at Telfer (as the open pit mine historically comprised over 75% of ore production at Telfer). The DCF analysis indicates that the Telfer mine extensions contemplated in either Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are expected to be subscale and marginal contributors to value.
Accordingly, the positive value hinges on the value of Newcrest’s interest in the Havieron project. The discount to the Scenario 2 NPV reflects Havieron’s status as a development project that is still subject to a feasibility study (and subsequent FID).
The recent negotiations between Newcrest and Greatland Gold plc (“Greatland”), which owns 30% of Havieron, can also provide some (albeit limited) evidence to value. These include announcements in:
 March 2022, that Greatland made a non-binding offer to acquire a 5% interest for $85 million (implied value of $1.7 billion for 100% of Havieron) which was not progressed; and

 August 2022, that an independent valuer determined that the option exercise price for a 5% interest to be $60 million (implied value of $1.2 billion for 100% of Havieron). The valuation was based on information (including geological data) available at 15 December 2021. Newcrest declined to exercise the option, stating that the price “did not meet Newcrest’s investment hurdles”.

The implied values resulting from these discussions are contradictory (the value of Havieron cannot be both less than $1.2 billion and greater than $1.7 billion). On the other end, the value ascribed by the independent valuer reflects the prescriptive process and principles outlined for the in the joint venture agreement. In most instances, Newcrest’s decision not to exercise the option (particularly given its knowledge of the asset) would suggest that $1.2 billion is a notional “ceiling” to the value of Havieron. However, there are several factors to suggest that the project value may have changed since then:
 over 1.9Moz of gold and 0.05Mt of copper have been added to mineral resource (approximately a 50% increase over previous estimates); and
 exploration studies and drilling continue to progress and the feasibility study is currently being undertaken.
On the other hand, upfront capital expenditure estimates are expected to increase materially due to the expanded scope and increased geotechnical and hydrogeological understanding of the deposit.

While it is difficult to make any definitive conclusions from these two datapoints, it is clear that the implied values resulting from these discussions are materially higher than the NPV outcome in the pre-feasibility study that was completed in October 2021 ($228 million). The significant uplift is due to the nature of the study, which calculated NPVs based on long term gold and copper prices of $1,500/oz and around $7,250/t, respectively. Valuation parameters in the current market environment would involve assumptions that would result in materially higher NPVs.
Another valuation benchmark is the recent share price performance and capital raisings undertaken by Greatland. Havieron is Greatland’s flagship asset and comprises most, if not all, of the company’s value (as its other exploration projects and joint ventures are less advanced and do not have any mineral resource). The analysis is set out below:

The analysis broadly points to a value for 100% of Havieron of around $1.4 billion. However, the valuation evidence from Greatland’s share price must be considered in light of its share price and its volatility. It has very limited broker coverage (only three analysts).
Wyloo Metals is a sophisticated investor that is familiar with the mining industry (albeit with no other investments in the gold sector). However, while its investment in Greatland represents a useful third party, arms’ length value for the project, it is necessary to recognise the emerging picture of materially higher development costs subsequent to the investment.
Taking these factors into consideration, Grant Samuel considers the valuation range for Telfer (including 70% of Havieron) of $500-600 million (inclusive of the value of remnant mineral resources) to be a reasonable balancing of these issues.


Now here's the Machiavellian part

Grant Samuel considers the materially higher minimum independent valuation of $ 1.7bn and dismisses it. They then contemplate the 1.2bn valuation which implies $840m for Newcrest 70% but then dismisses this and arrives at $500m-600m which arguably ascribes -ve $240+m to Telfer assuming $550m achieved. How nice...?

So here's a valuation thats a whole $240m lower than an independently adjudicated book value and at a discount, conveniently blamed on NCM's spurious "expected increased costs, due to the increasing the scope of the project" (ie 2mt to 3mt? ) So let me get that straight the project has the capacity to get bigger and be more profitable and Samuel marks the price lower. Hmmm ? - go figure.

Right, now for the really interesting BIT ;

Grant Samuel it turns out is also old mates with Fortescue Metals and i mean best mates really - long term clients and close advisors of 25 years. So long term and very close advisor... and most probably lucrative $$$ contractual friend.

NOW it's hard to be certain, but I think Grant Samuel have played an 'oil the wheels' role here for their 'oldest friends in the business" FMG.

See:
https://www.smh.com.au/business/fortesc ... dn3sk.html
From 2006 " Fortescue aims for $2b raising : Instead, Fortescue says it will continue working with advisers Grant Samuel and Citigroup, to finalise project documentation before the end of the month."

From 2009 Deutsche Bank advised Valin, while Fortescue was advised by J.P. Morgan and Grant Samuel.
https://www.financeasia.com/article/val ... eal/138162

https://www.sydneyminingclub.org/presen ... tescue.pdf Fortescue Metals Group Ltd The New Force in Iron Ore in 2005 Grant Samuel appointed to manage the 'global tender for the Christmas Creek Royalty'

But the clincher, Samuel didn't even mention any implications whatsoever of the ROLR . Surely a key lynch pin relevant to any valuation discussion. How fitting ...? Did they not know about the ROLR = Or did they chose to 'omit it' for political reasons...?

Samuel continues:

The implied EBITDA multiples for Telfer (inclusive of Havieron) are very low relative to the rest of Newcrest’s mineral assets (as well as the rest of the market evidence) due to the limited life of its open pit operations (closing in FY26). The resource multiples for Telfer (inclusive of Havieron) are below the market evidence due to the:

significant upfront capital to develop Havieron (relative to the project’s value at this point in time);
 lack of clarity for future growth plans, as the feasibility study for Havieron is still underway and more work is required to better define the extent of the underground mine extensions at Telfer; and
 challenging economics at Telfer’s existing operations, which are further impacted by the rehabilitation obligations at the end of its life.

The reserve multiples are more towards the middle of the range of the market evidence due to the very high resource-to-reserve ratio (over 4 times) and expectation that extending the operating life of Telfer beyond FY26 will lead to additional conversions of mineral resource to reserves. The production cases incorporate some of this upside, particularly at Havieron, which has only recognised 14Mt in ore reserves (but has 32Mt of ore included in Scenario 2 of the DCF analysis).

In Grant Samuel’s view, the multiples are a reasonable balancing of the opportunities and risks at Telfer.

NOW to Conclude :

Basically - I'm not sure WTF to make of all this 'variation in costs and valuations' but basically it goes something like this...

IMO Newcrest sought to set the NPV and profitability of Havieron ludicrously low to hurt GGP and facilitate a low ball takeover (or even full bankruptcy of GGP).

Grant Samuel have recognised this, and set out to mark the Hav transaction value down based in part on NCMs bad behaviour/stupidity (?) - consequently this sets the cash hurdle bar low as possible for GGP while Samuel’s assessment talks the “risks up and the overall talks the project value down”. This all discourages other potential bidders, given the ROLR? Of note here: A circa 8-10moz brownfield project, so low construction risk, low capex hurdle which and has easily attracted some of the biggest names, billionaires and talent in the Australia mining business from NST, FMG, BHP and Rio - talk about gamesmanship?

Ironically , these facts and the ‘validation of independent valuations’ can be construed that: When GGP stands to benefit from a high valuation price (ie like for the 5%) the independent valuer comes down in favour of GGP (not Newcrest) . But when GGP stands to benefit from a low valuation price, the independent values comes down in favour of GGP not Newmont , again valuing the project at the lower end of the spectrum.

Nothing like standing up for the little guy, eh? Anyone rationally looking at this situation might be forgiven for thinking Shaun actually 'Walks on Water'..

He got really unlucky, with Newcrest and then really really lucky with Newmont … but then there’s that saying “you make your own luck”, right?

Either that, or he has good friends in very high places.

[jecsggp]

Good, balanced assessment, Hydro, thanks.

Greatland/Shaun have been really quiet recently - keeping it all 'close to the chest'. Oh, to be a fly on the wall!

[Hydrogen]

Thanks Pal I was feeling a touch riled not mentioning any names…

But interestingly I didn’t realise the cosy old boy
client relationship between FMG and Grant Samuel.

Could prove extremely material.

[jecsggp]

Understood. The big hitters always have strong personalities that sometimes grate a bit.

[Shinybits]

The rehab cost of $160M would be the stuff of dreams… the head enviros and engineers at Telfer and the off the books word from DMIRS suggests a conservative figure of more like $5-600M (AUD that is) and apparently the available volume of topsoil required has been grossly underestimated for one thing, might seem trivial but not cheap to acquire what you don’t have, let alone in the middle of a desert that is as big as the UK.

On Wednesday of this week teams from both Greatlands and Northern Star attended Telfer for an overnight trip. I make no suggestion of any potential collusion but it seems a bit odd to the interested observer that they attended on the same day? Given Northern Star stated publicly that Telfer did ‘not fit within their investment profile’ when the Newmont takeover of Newcrest was first mooted it’s interesting that they have come for a look now.

In any case word from up on high suggests both parties were particularly happy and impressed with what they saw.

Has there been any suggestion of a collusion? Not suggesting or speculating, just asking.

The current expansion of west dome was just approved the week before last, which should see the west dome through until end of 25. Not sure if that’s calendar 25 or FY25, Australian financial year is July to June but US (NMC) is calendar year.

I wonder if enough value has been placed on telfer’s infrastructure? Three primary crushers, 2 SAGs, 2 ball mills, two entire trains of copper and pyrite notation, a copper larox, a whole COL circuit and a circuit of CCD thickeners surely would be worth seriously questioning the value of building a new plant, and all for the cost of a conveyor of a distance hardly ground breaking.

If they wanted to delve in to the future, they could investigate tear drop cross section conveyors, used in Europe to cross valleys. Eliminates camels tripping pull wires, minimizes environmental issues of wind and rain… thinking outside the box never hurts.

Just a few thoughts to ponder before I get shot at

[Hydrogen]

Interesting word from the decline there Shinybits

Re NST - Not to my knowledge - but I noticed that Chris Toon former Greatland CFO has just taken up a senior role at Northern Star..

https://www.linkedin.com/in/christopher ... bdomain=au

A GGP-NST JV wouldn’t surprise me and would fit with my thesis that one option would be a JV partner of GGP/Wyloo’s 'select' choice.

With GGPs ROLR the synergy makes sense. Significant overlap between NST GGP and FMG executive teams.

[Lennie]

Shinybits ... thx for the info .. I had to laugh at your mention of topsoil .. I think it is desert and there are tons of sand all around .. so I would not worry too much that depending on how it is done and not to ruin the habitats !

[Hydrogen]

Pretty sure I recall Chartbuster once saying the sand dunes are all heritage listed.

[zoros]

Who actually reads these war and peace posts?
Z

[Hydrogen]

The post isn’t war and peace its a cut and paste from Grant Samuel’s key points on Telfer Havieron.

Collated in easy to read form, especially for you! x

[Shinybits]

Shinybits ... thx for the info .. I had to laugh at your mention of topsoil .. I think it is desert and there are tons of sand all around .. so I would not worry too much that depending on how it is done and not to ruin the habitats !

Yeah mate as Hrydrogren said, it’s owned by local indigenous group and very difficult to get permission to interfere with even a small area, let alone dig up the hundreds of thousands of tonnes needed. And you can’t just take the top metre or so of just anywhere, the relatively sparse vegetation struggles as it is (basically doesn’t rain for 10 months a year) so you can’t just scrape off what you want from wherever you feel like it. The enviros reckon it’s a grossly underestimated issue because on the surface (no pun intended) it doesn’t seem like much or a problem.

Just one aspect of closure I guess, but I’d be very surprised if Telfer wasn’t still going in one form or another for several years yet.